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Chapter 2: Beyond left and right: The end of an old order? 
As I explained in Chapter 1, one of the aims of this book is to challenge the idea that placing voters and parties 
on a single left-right spectrum can fully explain political competition in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. I 
suggest that in many contexts, a cultural dimension of political competition is just as important in explaining 
party choice. This applies both to Britain and to many other European countries. But to make this point we 
must address two fundamental questions. First, what do we understand by “left” and “right” and how have 
these notions evolved over time? Second, what do we understand by the “cultural dimension” of political 
competition and what kind of issues does it aggregate? In this chapter I will attempt to address these 
questions by considering the role of society and how conflicting interests within it have driven (changes in) 
political preferences. In doing so I will draw on the body of literature that addresses not only the issue of 
what political preferences are and how they are defined and classified, but also how these preferences are 
rooted in social structure. 
The terms “left” and “right” first appeared in late eighteenth century France to describe the position deputies 
sat in the National Assembly in the immediate aftermath of the 1789 French Revolution. The mainly 
aristocratic deputies who supported the Catholic Church and the king sat to the right of the president, while 
supporters of the revolution sat to his left. By the twentieth century, however, “left” and “right” were 
understood as economic ideologies, with the right representing a preference for private enterprise and free 
market ideology, and the left favouring state intervention in the economy and a redistribution of wealth from 
the rich to the poor. The extreme left position was represented by the communist parties of Europe, which 
advocated full public (state) ownership of the means of production and distribution of wealth. 
Cleavage Theory 
The shift in the meaning attributed to “left” and “right” through the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries coincided with the development of new forms of conflict within society. According to cleavage 
theory, as European societies modernised, a series of conflicts within them became salient and came to 
define party political competition. For Lipset and Rokkan (1967), two major processes shaped the diverse 
political landscape in Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution. The first was the national revolution, 
which occurred as the state gradually began to play a more significant role in the lives of ordinary citizens 
through the increasing power of the state bureaucracy and, more generally, the “widening … scope of 
governmental activities” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 13). Through the expansion of state-created or state-
sanctioned projects such as the establishment of universal education, the railways, post office and police, by 
the latter part of the nineteenth century most citizens had had some kind of contact with the state and its 
agents (Hobsbawm 1990: 80-81). This marked a clear break from the earlier period in which the state was 
remote and relied on indirect rule via intermediaries such as nobles and priests (Hechter 2000: 57). For Lipset 
and Rokkan, the growing influence of a standardising state led to “increasing resistance of the ethnically, 
linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and the peripheries” (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967: 14). What is more, states increasingly sought control over education, wresting the power to 
educate the younger generation away from the family and, most importantly, away from the Church. In 
countries with a significant number of Catholics whose religious allegiance was to Rome, not the state capital, 
this issue became particularly divisive and led to a schism between secular and religious interests (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967: 15). In short, the national revolution generated two forms of cleavage, one between the centre 
and the periphery and one between the (Catholic) Church and the state (and more generally between 
religious and secular sections of society). 
The second major process was the industrial revolution that gradually took hold of Europe through the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This first of all led to a conflict between landed (agrarian) interests 
and the interests of industrial entrepreneurs (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 14). Later on this conflict was 
superseded by a conflict that pitted wage earners against owners and employers and led to the emergence 
of the trade union movement and of socialist, communist and social democratic parties (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967: 21). This latter conflict can be seen as a cleavage between capital and labour and is the one on which 
the left-right divide, in its economic sense, rests. 
For Lipset and Rokkan (1967), these four societal cleavages—between centre and periphery, between church 
and state, between land and industry and between owner and worker—interacted in different ways in 
different European countries. In countries such as the United Kingdom where the dominant religion was also 
the state religion, the church-state cleavage did not really apply. In Roman Catholic countries, on the other 
hand, it proved particularly divisive. Moreover, the relevance of each cleavage and the different interests 
each one aggregated determined the grassroots interests that the emerging mass political parties came to 
represent (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 27-29). By the twentieth century the owner-worker cleavage separated 
supporters of economically left-wing socialist, communist and social democratic parties from those of 
economically right-wing conservative and liberal parties in virtually all Western European countries (with the 
exception of Ireland). However, some European party systems retained the hallmarks of the earlier three 
cleavages, especially in terms of the existence of Christian democratic and other church-based political 
parties.1 
The Evolution of Political Parties in the UK 
The development of political parties in the United Kingdom illustrates the way Lipset and Rokkan's cleavages 
shaped party competition. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the two main parties of the time on 
the one hand reflected the land/industry cleavage; the Conservative (Tory) Party had become the party of 
the rural gentry while the Liberals (Whigs) had become the party of urban entrepreneurs. On the other hand, 
the party divide also reflected the centre-periphery cleavage with the Conservatives representing the centre 
and the liberals representing the periphery. Geographically this meant that the Conservatives dominated in 
London and the South-East of England, while the Liberal, Independent Liberal and Irish Parliamentary parties 
(the latter two being Liberal allies) held sway in Scotland, Wales and Ireland, as well as in some industrial 
heartlands such as Birmingham. This corresponds to Lipset and Rokkan's suggestion that in Britain the 
centre's state-building project during the “national revolution” was supported by the established Church and 
the landowning class and resisted by peripheral interests in Wales, Scotland and Ireland, by some urban 
industrial entrepreneurs and by the non-conformist churches (dominant especially in Wales) (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1965: 37). 
                                                          
1 In the Netherlands there were three separate parties representing distinct religious denominations: the Catholic People's 
Party, representing Roman Catholics, as well as the Anti-Revolutionary Party and the Christian Historical Union representing the 
Dutch Protestants. These parties merged in 1977 to form the Christian Democratic Appeal. 
If we fast forward to the years immediately following World War I, we see that this pattern had started to 
change as the owner-worker cleavage had begun to take precedence over earlier cleavages. The centre-
periphery divide was still in evidence with the Conservatives strongest in London and the south-east and the 
Liberals still holding on in parts of Wales and Scotland (Ireland's newly found independence representing 
perhaps a consequence of a less resolvable centre-periphery cleavage). However, the industrial areas in parts 
of London, the North Midlands, South Wales and Southern Scotland had now been taken over by an insurgent 
Labour Party, who had begun to take swathes of the (newly enfranchised) working class vote. 
If we now take another leap in time, this time to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, we see 
Conservative dominance of the more affluent rural areas and Labour prevailing in the industrial urban areas. 
By the time of the 1950 elections, which Labour won with a majority of just five, the Liberals were reduced 
to a rump of just nine seats. 
The dominant cleavage both in Britain and on the near continent during the immediate post-war period was 
therefore between labour and capital, and this manifested itself in an ideological struggle between left and 
right in their economic sense. In Britain, labour was represented by the Labour Party and capital by the 
Conservatives. The situation was complicated somewhat in parts of continental Europe by a secular religious 
divide, although in Catholic countries this divide tended to reinforce the left-right cleavage. As Seymour 
Martin Lipset put it, “in countries such as France, Italy, Spain and Austria, being Catholic has meant being 
allied with rightist or conservative groups in politics; while being anti-clerical (or a member of a minority 
religion) has most often meant alliance with the left” (Lipset 1959: 92). 
Post-bourgeois values 
During the late 1960s a new group of issues became salient both in Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe 
as the new counter-culture began to take hold. These issues included freedom of speech, racial equality, 
women's rights, gay rights, environmentalism and the legalisation of soft drugs. Ronald Inglehart (1971, 1977) 
referred to these issues as “post-bourgeois” or “post-material” and contrasted them with the purely 
“acquisitive” or “materialist” issues that had dominated politics in the immediate post-War period. By the 
end of the 1960s the new issues were beginning to shape the values of more affluent members of the younger 
generation, while classic (economic) left-right or “materialist” issues continued to frame political discourse 
amongst middle-aged and older voters. In terms of voting behaviour, Inglehart suggests that the emergence 
of post-bourgeois values and their association with middle class youth could lead to the emergence of new 
parties or even “reverse the traditional alignment of the working class with the Left, and the middle class 
with the Right” (Inglehart 1971: 1009). To support this, he finds that in the six cases he studied (Britain, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy) those holding “post-bourgeois” values were more 
likely to support left-leaning parties and New Left parties such as D66 in the Netherlands (Inglehart 1971: 
1013). 
Despite the changing values that defined politics, Inglehart believed that the new “post-bourgeois” values 
could be incorporated into the existing left-right dimension, arguing that “the new Left-Right continuum 
resembles the old in that it pits forces of change against those of the status quo—but the values motivating 
change relate to life styles rather than acquisition” (Inglehart 1971: 1016). Thus Inglehart has a rather vague 
notion of “left” and “right”. In a joint paper written with John Huber the two authors argue that the left-right 
dimension is “an amorphous vessel whose meaning varies in systematic ways with the underlying political 
and economic conditions in a given society” (Huber and Inglehart 1995: 90). Thus, despite their changing 
contents in terms of values, Inglehart still believed that “left” and “right” remained useful categories for 
explaining political competition in Europe. 
Writing in 1971, Inglehart held that in Britain those who adhered to “post-bourgeois” values (such as 
protecting free speech and giving people more say in political decision-making) were more likely to vote 
Labour or Liberal and less likely to vote Conservative (Inglehart 1971: 1009). However, his data showed that 
“post-bourgeois” values had less influence on voting behaviour in Britain than in the other Western European 
countries he studied. In Britain these new values became relevant to party competition only very gradually. 
As an illustration, let us take the example of gay rights. During the 1960s initiatives to liberalise laws 
criminalising homosexual acts were promoted by backbench MPs, most notably the Conservative MP 
Humphrey Berkeley and the Labour MP Leo Abse. It was a non-partisan campaign. When Leo Abse's bill to 
decriminalise homosexual acts between adults over the age of twenty-one was passed in 1967, it was 
introduced as a private members bill. The (Labour) government front bench remained neutral for fear of a 
backlash by voters and, most tellingly, only 117 MPs bothered to vote either for or against the bill at its Third 
Reading.2 In the late 1960s gay rights was therefore not a salient political issue. 
Indeed gay rights only became a salient issue for party competition in the 1980s. Through the 1960s and 
1970s the mainstream Left in the shape of the Labour Party did not associate itself with the gay rights 
movement, despite the establishment of a fringe group called Labour Campaign for Gay Rights in 1978.3 No 
mention is made of this issue in official Labour Party policy statements until a pledge in Labour's Programme, 
1982 for equal rights for gay people and for a reduction in the gay age of consent to 18 (Buckle 2015: 99). 
However, this pledge was watered down somewhat in the party's 1983 election manifesto, which only 
includes the following short statement: 
 We are concerned that homosexuals are unfairly treated. We will take steps to ensure that 
 they are not unfairly discriminated against—especially in employment and in the definition of 
 privacy contained in the 1967 Act—along the lines set out in Labour's Programme, 1982.4  
The Labour-led Greater London Council (GLC) and some other Labour-controlled councils had begun funding 
LGBT groups in the early 1980s. However, even at that time, homosexuality was even more frowned upon by 
Labour supporters than by Conservative supporters; according to a 1983 British Social Attitudes poll, 67% of 
Labour supporters thought that homosexuality was always or mostly wrong, compared with 61% of 
Conservative supporters and 48% of Liberal/SDP supporters.5  The widespread disapproval of homosexuality 
was fanned by the recent rapid spread of HIV/AIDS and the frequent targeting of homosexuals in the tabloid 
press (see below). 
                                                          
2 UK Parliament website, <https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-
lives/relationships/collections1/sexual-offences-act-1967/sexual-offences-act-1967>, accessed 28 March 2018. 
3 See the LGBT Labour website, <http://www.lgbtlabour.org.uk/history>, accessed 28 March 2018. 
4 Labour's 1983 Manifesto, available at <http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab83.htm>, accessed 28 March 
2018. 
5 British Social Attitudes, “Homosexuality”, available at <http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-
attitudes-30/personal-relationships/homosexuality.aspx>, accessed 29 March 2018. 
Perhaps a critical turning point came in 1984 with the launch of a campaign group called “Lesbians and Gays 
Support the Miners” aimed at uniting the LGBT community with mining communities in their fight against 
Thatcher, a struggle that featured in the 2014 film Pride. The success of this group in raising funds for striking 
miners raised the profile of gay rights issues within the Labour Party and a motion supporting equal rights for 
gay men and lesbians was passed at the 1985 Labour Party Conference in Bournemouth thanks to the block 
vote of the National Union for Mineworkers (NUM) and despite a refusal of the National Executive Committee 
to support the motion.6 
However, more than the growing sympathies of at least a part of the Labour movement towards gay rights, 
perhaps it was the growing hostility of much of the Conservative Party to this issue and, in particular, the 
vilification of the gay community and their putative links with “the loony left” that made gay rights a party 
political issue. Right-wing newspapers such as the Daily Mail and the Daily Express frequently portrayed the 
Labour Party and its leader Neil Kinnock as being in hock to extreme left-wing and minority interests.7 The 
issue of homosexuality became a part of the 1987 election campaign when a Conservative poster warned 
that Labour wanted the book “Young, Gay and Proud” to be read in schools.8 In 1988, the Conservative 
government under Margaret Thatcher introduced Section 28 (Clause 28) of the Local Government Act 1988, 
which amended the Local Government Act 1986 to include a clause that local authorities “shall not 
intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality”. 
This was in response to a perception that left-wing Labour councils were attempting to pervert “normal 
family life”.  
Similarly, issues of race and gender discrimination were also not specifically party political issues until the 
1980s. The issue of race relations did not play a significant role in the 1974 elections and the 1976 Race 
                                                          
6 Colin Clews, “1985. Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners. Part Two.” GAY in the 80s: From Fighting for Our Rights to 
Fighting for Our Lives. Available at <http://www.gayinthe80s.com/2012/09/1985-lesbians-and-gays-support-the-miners-part-two>, 
accessed 29 March 2018. 
7 See, for example the 1987 Sunday Express cartoon by Cummings. Available at Pink Singers: London's LGBT Community 
Choir, “Section 28”. Available at <http://www.pinksingers.co.uk/singing-the-changes/section-28>, accessed 29 March 2018. 
8 Sanders, Sue; Spraggs, Gill (1989). "Section 28 and Education". Available at <http://www.schools-out.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Section-28-and-Education-Sue-Sanders-Gillian-Spragg-1989.pdf>, accessed 29 March 2018.  
Relations Act was supported by a majority of Conservative MPs with just forty-three Tories voting against the 
Act on its Third Reading (Anwar et al. 2000: 9). Similarly the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act, while initiated by 
Labour, enjoyed cross-party support. Once again, it was only in the 1980s that issues of gender and race 
became a salient issue that separated Labour and the Conservatives. The Labour Party manifesto in 1979 
barely mentioned race relations, restricting itself to a rather bland pledge to strengthen and widen the scope 
of the Race Relations Act and a brief statement that “immigration and citizenship law needs revision”. In the 
1983 manifesto, however, the party pledged to “repeal the 1971 Immigration Act and the 1981 British 
Nationality Act and replace them with a citizenship law that does not discriminate against either women or 
black and Asian Britons”. The manifesto devoted two sections and over 500 words to “Equal Rights” and 
“Nationality and Immigration”, promising measures to prevent discrimination and a more liberal immigration 
policy to benefit relatives of immigrants already resident in the UK.9 In the right-wing media, meanwhile, 
anti-racism became associated with the “loony left” (see the link provided in footnote 17 as an example), 
illustrating how discourse over race and anti-racism had become politically salient. Similarly the Greenham 
Common Peace Camp established in 1981 by women against the deployment of cruise missiles at an army 
base led to a discourse that associated feminism with the Left (and specifically the Labour Party) and 
traditional family values with the Conservatives.10 
In summary, therefore, “cultural issues” did not become salient for political competition in Britain until the 
1980s and when they did they seemed to fit quite smoothly onto the existing left-right spectrum with the 
left (and the Labour Party) coming to be associated with anti-racism, feminism and gay rights and the right 
(and the Conservative Party) taking a more reactionary stance on all issues. 
                                                          
9 Tony Collins, “Labour 1983: the Most Inspiring Suicide Note in History”, Socialist Unity (23 March, 2013), available at 
<http://socialistunity.com/labour-1983-the-most-inspiring-suicide-note-in-history>, accessed 4 April 2018. 
10 Indeed Margaret Thatcher herself famously espouses “Victorian values” in the 1983 election campaign (Samuel 1992). 
Beyond left and right: The need for a cultural dimension 
The association of the “economic left” with the “cultural left” (i.e. anti-discrimination and freedom of lifestyle 
choices) and the corresponding association of the “economic” and “cultural” right is not a necessary one. 
Two relatively recent developments illustrate the way that the economic and cultural definitions of “left” and 
“right” are not necessarily associated, at least not in the same way. The first was the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 and the development of multi-party systems in the former communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Research on party positions across Europe suggests that while in Western Europe 
economically left wing parties tend to be more socially progressive in terms of lifestyle issues, tolerance of 
difference and law and order, and right-wing parties tend to be more “authoritarian” on these issues, in many 
post-communist Europe countries a reverse correlation applies with economically right-wing parties adopting 
a more progressive stance on cultural issues and economically left-wing parties holding a more conservative 
position (Marks et al. 2006).  
The second development that suggests that the economic and cultural dimensions may not always correlate 
is the emergence of strongly culturally right-wing movements in many parts of Europe, discussed in Chapter 
1. Perhaps the earliest of these to emerge was the French National Front (Front National, FN), led by Jean-
Marie Le Pen and later his daughter Marine Le Pen. While unapologetically anti-immigrant and authoritarian, 
the FN adopts some rather left-wing policies on the economy, such as more generous welfare payments 
(albeit only for “native French”) (Stockemer and Amengay 2015: 374). Other such parties have gained 
strength in northern Europe especially (see Chapter 1), but their positions on economic policies are either 
rather ambiguous or even left of centre. What distinguishes them from mainstream parties is their dislike of 
immigration and cultural heterogeneity, i.e. their position on a cultural dimension of political competition. 
These developments suggest that forcing both economic and cultural issues into a single over-arching left-
right dimension is an oversimplification and that instead the field of political competition in much of Europe 
can better be understood as two-dimensional. Some scholars (Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks et al. 2006) 
therefore propose a two-dimensional policy space that is defined not only by an economic left-right 
dimension but also by a cultural dimension that they call TAN/GAL, an acronym of traditional-authoritarian-
nationalist versus green-alternative-libertarian. Others have proposed alternative two-dimensional schema 
with different labels for the cultural dimension, such as libertarian-authoritarian (Kitschelt 1994, 1995) and 
many more (see below). 
The recent emergence of culturally “right-wing” or TAN parties and movements, of which the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) is a further example, highlights what may be a new (fifth) cleavage that is 
increasingly dividing societies in Europe and beyond. This is a cleavage between “winners” and “losers” of 
globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006), also termed the “transnational cleavage” (Hooghe and Marks 2018). 
Globalisation, seen in terms of economic and cultural integration both with neighbouring countries (e.g. 
through transnational organisations such as the EU) and with the rest of the world, has benefitted some 
citizens but has disadvantaged others. Those who lack the education, skills and wherewithal to cope in a 
globalised economy have lost out, while those who have the opportunity to take advantage of a more 
globalised business environment or to work, study and travel abroad have benefitted. The former tend to 
reject the idea of an open economy and open borders and oppose immigration and EU integration, while the 
latter embrace these innovations. Most of all, it seems to be cultural resistance to globalisation, more than 
a leftist rejection of global capitalism, that has come to define party competition at the end of the twentieth 
century and the beginning of the twenty-first. This has manifested itself both in the increasing prominence 
of new culturally right-wing parties and in the repositioning of existing parties to fit the new cleavage (Kriesi 
et al. 2008). This does not rule out the possibility of a leftist rejection of global capitalism—there have already 
been signs of this development in southern European countries such as Spain and Greece, and perhaps even 
in Jeremy Corbyn's Labour Party—however, in most European countries in the first two decades of the 
twenty-first century it has been the culturally rightist movements that have gained pre-eminence. 
Authors who emphasise the cleavage between “winners” and “losers” of globalisation have a slightly 
different conception of the principal issues that define the cultural dimension compared with those scholars 
who draw from Inglehart's notion of “post-bourgeois” values, although (unlike Inglehart himself) they also 
propose a two-dimensional ideological space. While those who highlight cleavage politics give priority to 
issues such as immigration and EU integration (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008), the latter group associate “post-
bourgeois” values with TAN/GAL, emphasising more issues of law and order, environmentalism, gay rights 
and abortion (Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks et al. 2006). Most recently adherents of this second group have 
attempted to marry the two concepts by suggesting that as a result of the “transnational cleavage” 
immigration and EU integration have become more prominent elements of TAN/GAL (Hooghe and Marks 
2018).  However, a touch of ambiguity still prevails as to precisely which issues define the cultural dimension 
and this ambiguity is perhaps reflected in the many labels that have been associated with this dimension. 
These include libertarian-universalistic vs traditionalist-communitarian (Bornschier 2010), universalism vs 
particularism (Beramendi et al. 2015; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015) and cosmopolitan vs communitarian 
(Teney et al. 2014; Wheatley 2015). 
Scholars of British politics also point to recent changes in the structure of society and a consequent increase 
in the salience of cultural issues in politics. Ford and Goodwin (2014) explore the rise of UKIP, arguing that 
the surge in support for UKIP from 2010 to 2013 was the result of a transformation of society that had been 
underway since the 1980s. For Ford and Goodwin, the decline of heavy industry and the corresponding shift 
to a post-industrial economy left older and less well-educated blue collar workers with few opportunities to 
progress. As a result, this group of voters, whom they label the “left behind”, have become increasingly 
isolated, pessimistic and convinced that their way of life is under threat. Mass immigration has increased 
their sense of insecurity as they face ever greater competition from immigrants over semi-skilled and 
unskilled jobs. To add insult to injury, the three establishment political parties have been fighting to win over 
the now more numerous and dominant middle class, leaving “left behind” voters relegated to mere 
“spectators in electoral battles for the educated middle-class vote" (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 117). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, this group demonstrates a significantly higher probability than middle-class, well-educated 
voters to be Eurosceptic, to oppose immigration and to hold onto a traditional view of Britishness. It was this 
group, Ford and Goodwin argue, that made up the bedrock of support for Nigel Farage's UKIP (Ford and 
Goodwin 2014). They also overwhelmingly voted to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum (Goodwin and 
Heath 2016). Although these authors do not explicitly discuss the impact of globalisation, the implication of 
their argument is that this group of voters has been “left behind” by a rapidly changing and ever more 
globalised world.  
A similar argument is made by Goodhart (2017), who divides British voters into two main groups: 
“Anywheres”, well-educated, cosmopolitan citizens who have “achieved” identities and feel “generally 
comfortable and confident with new places and people”, and “Somewheres”, who “are more rooted and 
usually have 'ascribed' identities” (Goodhart 2017: 3). For Goodhart, those older white working class men 
whom Ford and Goodwin describe as “left behind” make up the core group of Somewheres (ibid.). While 
both Anywheres and Somewheres form quite heterogeneous groups with Somewheres ranging “from 
northern working class pensioners to Home Counties Daily Mail readers; Anywheres from polished business 
executives to radical academics” (Goodhart 2017: 4) both groups are associated with their own distinct set 
of values. Anywheres represent what Goodhart refers to as a “progressive individualism” that “places a high 
value on mobility and novelty and a much lower value on group identity, tradition and national social 
contracts”, while Somewheres are “more conservative and communitarian by instinct” and “feel 
uncomfortable about many aspects of cultural and economic change”  (Goodhart 2017: 5). Goodhart goes 
on to argue that an Anywhere elite has been in control of the political agenda for the last twenty-five years 
(Goodhart 2017: 10) but in recent years has more and more faced resistance from Somewheres; a resistance 
that ultimately led to the 2016 vote to leave the EU. The crux of Goodhart's argument is very similar to those 
described above; it proposes a growing gap between those who thrive in a new global world and those who 
feel threatened and undermined by it—a gap that is ever more reflected in an ideological divide over cultural 
rather than economic values. 
In Britain the divide between Anywheres and Somewheres (or between “winners” and “losers” of 
globalisation) has a geographical dimension. Jennings and Stoker (2016) contrast “cosmopolitan areas” from 
“provincial backwaters”. In the former, they argue “we find an England that is global in outlook; relatively 
positive about the EU; pro-immigration; comfortable with more rights and respect for women, ethnic 
communities and gays and lesbians; and generally future-oriented”, while the latter tends to be “inward-
looking, relatively negative about the EU and immigration, worried by the emergence of new rights for 
‘minorities’ and prone to embracing nostalgia” (Jennings and Stoker 2016: 372). They show that differences 
in attitudes between “cosmopolitan areas” and “provincial backwaters” has widened in recent years, 
particularly over issues relating to immigration, ethnic minorities and Europe (Jennings and Stoker 2016: 
375). The implication is that it is not only people, but entire regions that are being “left behind” by 
globalisation as global economic change is driving uneven development  (Jennings and Stoker 2016: 373). 
Highly skilled jobs are concentrated in Britain's more dynamic cities and towns, as both investment and skilled 
labour drain from more peripheral regions. This geographical divide is not the same as the “north-south 
divide” that was seen to define “haves” and “have nots” in the 1980s and 1990s; “provincial backwaters” 
may be found at just a short distance from “cosmopolitan areas” such as inner London.  
Jennings and Stoker's distinction between “cosmopolitan areas” and “provincial backwaters” is also reflected 
in the way regions voted in the EU referendum. Boston in Lincolnshire recorded the highest vote to leave the 
EU, at 75.6% for leave, while Lambeth in inner London recorded the strongest remain vote (outside Gibraltar) 
with 78.6% voting to remain in the EU. Particularly sharp differences were recorded between metropolitan 
areas and neighbouring “backwater” areas. Thus, Havering, at the edge of London voted 69.7% to leave, a 
sharp contrast to metropolitan Lambeth. Similarly, while Manchester voted 60.4% to remain, Wigan, at the 
edge of Greater Manchester, voted 63.9% to leave. Finally, while Leeds just voted to remain (by 50.3%), next 
door Wakefield voted 66.4% to leave.  
All these shifts suggest a value-based divide that is predicated on education, age and geographical location 
(for more on the influence of age and education on the Brexit vote, see Chapter 1). Despite the fact that it 
has an economic dimension insofar as it sets economically prosperous regions against economically 
underprivileged “backwaters”, the nature of the divide relates primarily to cultural values that are intimately 
related with the notion of identity, especially with respect to outsiders and the outside. A number of scholars 
believe that this value divide is not only intensifying but will continue to do so and may come to replace 
(economic) right versus left as the principle ideological divide in much of Europe. Häusermann and Kriesi 
(2015) argue that even some issues that are normally considered traditional left-right issues, such as spending 
and taxation, are increasingly becoming cultural or identity issues. This is because state spending is not only 
about how much to spend, but also about whether benefits should be universal or targeted at particular in-
groups (often excluding labour market outsiders such as foreigners and young people). The European debt 
crisis has meant that flexibility about how much to spend is more limited, giving extra salience to issues about 
whether benefits should be shared by “outsiders” or restricted to “insiders” only. According to Häusermann 
and Kriesi, “social insurance for labor market insiders competes with needs-based benefits for outsiders and 
low-income workers” (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015: 226). 
Summary 
Let us summarise the argument so far. “Left” and “right” are fluid concepts and their meanings have shifted 
significantly over time as the structure of society has changed. In the sense it was used in the twentieth 
century, “left” and “right” referred above all to economic ideologies and to the diverging interests of labour 
and capitals. However, by the end of the century a set of cultural issues that could not so easily be assimilated 
into a unidimensional left-right dimension had become salient both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in 
Europe. In the first two decades of the twenty-first century a divide (or cleavage) between “winners” and 
“losers” of globalisation appeared to underpin these differences in cultural values. The divide would seem to 
correlate strongly with age, education and geographic location, at least in the case of Britain. Instead of 
describing the political position of a party or voter along a unidimensional left-right scale, it would therefore 
perhaps make more sense to define political ideology in terms of two dimensions: one economic left-right 
dimension that aggregates issues relating to distribution of wealth and the role of the state in the economy 
and one cultural dimension that aggregates issues relating to identity and tradition. As the specific issues that 
belong to each dimension may be context-dependent, we still have some work to do identifying what they 
are. Our next task is therefore first to verify the assumption that political opinion in Britain can indeed be 
defined by two overarching ideological dimensions, then to define more precisely the issues that these 
dimensions encompass (if they exist), before determining from where on the resulting two-dimensional 
ideological map the main parties draw their votes, exploring whether or not the ideological profiles of party 
voters are changing and finally addressing the question of whether politics—as defined by the positions of 
voters—is becoming more polarised along either dimension. To do this we will need to draw on real life data 
on the opinions of British voters. It is to this task that we devote our energies in the following two chapters. 
